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ABSTRACT
The rhino is going extinct due to poaching at a rate which far outstrips current 
law enforcement or conservation efforts to halt their decline. A critical aspect of 
counter-poaching failures to date is an inaccurate view of the nature of poaching 
as a crime. Rather than demand-side efforts, attacking elusive smuggling networks 
or expensive technical solutions like drones, this article notes how a quasi-military 
tactical approach of ‘combat tracking’ offers the best way to protect the species. 
Based on wide ranging interviews and fieldwork across dozens of parks in southern 
Africa, it demonstrates how the current restricted range of the rhino, and the rarity 
of skilled poachers, makes a tactical solution the most effective to date.
ARTICLE HISTORY received 21 august 2017; accepted 24 October 2017
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The rhinoceros is going extinct. That, at least, is the sensible projection to make 
when one looks at the pace of their demise due not only to habitat loss and 
general human encroachment, but specifically poaching. The significant efforts 
made over the last few decades to prevent the extinction of such ‘charismatic 
megafauna’ have not achieved their hoped-for aims. Poaching of Africa’s rhinos 
has escalated exponentially from an average loss of 0.17 rhinos per day (a total 
of 62 rhinos) in 2007, to 2.04 rhinos per day (a total of 745 rhinos) in 2012 and 
getting worse.1 During 2014, in South Africa alone, a staggering 1215 rhinos 
were killed by poachers: roughly one every eight hours. One thousand one 
hundred seventy-five rhinos were poached in South Africa during 2015.2 With 
officially only approximately 5000 Black Rhino still extant and a further 20,000 
White Rhino at the time of writing, the foreseeable future of these species can-
not even be numbered in decades. Privately, sources in African parks have told 
the authors that even these numbers are inflated, and in reality, far fewer of 
both species are believed to remain.3 One recent model puts total extirpation 
of African rhino species in less than 20 years’ time.4 This is not inevitable. As the 
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authors of that study note, ‘for rhinos, extinction is an option in the control of 
humans’.5
Yet, we have not yet forestalled that option. Conservationists and govern-
ments have failed to halt the catastrophic decline of the African rhino because 
they have been approaching the problem with the incorrect approach based 
on a misunderstanding of poaching as a crime. Historically, poaching has been 
treated as an organised criminal activity analogous to narcotic production or 
organ smuggling; protection of the animals themselves has been treated as an 
issue of zoology or animal husbandry. Neither set of approaches is correct. In 
fact, with the current stunning rate of decline, nothing will work to preserve 
the rhino from extinction other than to treat the poaching of rhino (and, also, 
elephant) as effectively a security issue. Poaching both the rhino and the ele-
phant require specific, rare skills and is fixed to a tactical approach of tracking 
and stalking the animal. This is the single chokepoint which can be attacked and 
defeated with the current resources, and in time to save the rhino and halt the 
rapid decline of the elephant. This more securitised approach to counter-poach-
ing is also likely the best method to combat large-scale bush-meat poaching 
or the collector poaching seen with the pangolin and other exotic species in 
Africa’s parks and game reserves.
The authors of this article conducted hundreds of interviews across major 
national parks and game reserves in central and southern Africa since 2014. 
They engaged with rangers, zoologists, conservationists, trackers, poachers 
and guards. The contrast between the conservation approaches in the parks 
where the rhino is being protected (such as the Savé Valley Conservancy in 
Zimbabwe) and where it is not (such as in Kruger National Park) is marked. 
Working closely with the rangers in these parks, the authors gained fresh insight 
to the nature of the ‘food chain’ of poaching in Africa, going to the very tip of the 
supply-end, the tracker/poacher himself. It is this information, provided by the 
men & women who struggle daily and at the threat of their own lives to protect 
the rhino and elephant, which allows the authors to suggest a new paradigm 
for counter-poaching. Some interviews have been anonymised at the request 
of the interview subjects.
This article aims to contribute to the survival of the Rhino by reformatting our 
approach to the conservation of the rhino and, to a lesser extent the elephant 
and other species in protected areas and parks. Saving these species is a matter, 
effectively, of securing an asset which conservationists and governments already 
own: the threatened animals, which exist almost without exception within parks 
and protected areas, already having been extirpated from ‘the wild’.6 Unlike the 
‘war on drugs’, it is possible to wage a war on poaching: the poacher is a known, 
armed individual who is not easily replaced. The main good being ‘produced’ is 
entirely in our hands, and ours to protect within a delimited space. If we treat 
this problem not as organised crime – which at the supply side, it resembles 
only superficially – but rather as a quasi-military, essentially tactical problem 
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of defending the rhino or elephant physically, we have an opportunity to buy 
time for more comprehensive long-term demand-side solutions to take effect. 
Target the professional poacher – the true choke point of illegal wildlife trade, 
to provide security for the animal.
Poaching as Organised Crime
If we are to blunt or defeat large-scale organised poaching,7 it is necessary to 
have a clear view of the activity as a criminal act. Currently there is only a very 
thin and largely anecdotal literature on the nature of wildlife trafficking.8 In this 
study, we identify the sui generis qualities of the crime, and in doing so, we can 
also understand how approaches which have been successful against other 
organised criminal activities have failed to prevent the decline of the rhino 
and the elephant. In scientific literature and popular news, there is a tendency 
to label poaching as organised crime.9 It is quite common to group poaching 
together with supply, sale and transport of illicit goods, especially narcotics. 
While partially true, this labelling is quite detrimental to counter-poaching 
efforts, and indeed some research has suggested it is actively harmful.10
The effect is easiest to understand when we divide an organised criminal 
activity to three phases – supply, trafficking and demand/distribution. The traf-
ficking networks are the same as those of, for example, narcotics. The demand/
distribution side also has many common qualities between poaching and illicit 
goods trade. However, the true heart of the activity is the supply – the act of 
poaching itself – which does not share much with other types of organised 
criminal activities. In fact, there is a distinct lack of any evidence pointing to 
poachers fulfilling any definition of organised crime. Comparing most defini-
tions, as compiled by Frank Hagan, with actual research shows just this.11 There 
is a notable lack of restricted membership, professionalism, rigid organisational 
structures and for some syndicates even violence with the supply side of poach-
ing. Common opinion that poachers are master criminals12, while useful for fund 
raising, is quite detrimental to the actual cause.
In using the organised crime label, counter-poaching efforts are made more 
difficult for three reasons. In the first instance, the ‘organised crime’ label focuses 
efforts at the transnational level, or on the ‘kingpins’, who are without excep-
tion hardened criminals that have been trafficking for years.13 These efforts 
have given and continue to give poor return for the resources used.14 In part, 
combating the demand and trafficking networks in areas where rule of law is 
diminished and corruption rife – specifically the main market of Vietnam and 
African post-revolutionary states – does not work with other illicit goods either 
(The Guardian, 7 May 2016).15 Last, the label forces an association of supply side 
tactics of organised crime with poaching. The illicit goods trade is fought at the 
supply level with law enforcement methods that are largely incompatible or 
inefficient with poaching. It is this last point which warrants a longer discussion.
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The Supply Side of Poaching
Poaching of elephant or rhinoceros almost always begins with a middle man 
ordering a hunt in one form or another. The majority of researched parks also 
see weapons and spending money delivered by this middle man who is the first 
link in the trafficking network.16 Non-syndicated, or opportunistic, poachers 
generally lack this supporting and enabling structure, but they also do not pose 
a serious threat as they often lack training, are easy to catch and have trouble 
selling their product.17 There are a few differences in how syndicates gather 
poaching parties. Some examples include the middle man contacting a trusted 
man in the crew to put it together, while others see the crew already existing 
as an established unit that mostly works together.18 Middle men come from a 
wide range of backgrounds from retired poachers to corrupt law enforcement 
officials and as such are easily replaced when disrupted. Networks that have 
long been in operation generally also seem to be more vertically streamlined 
and have a stricter hierarchy, although they are very different in hierarchy when 
compared to actual organised criminal networks, organised as a small syndicate 
or cell of three or four, rather than a vertical hierarchy.19
Rhinoceros poachers hunt almost always in a group of three or four, regard-
less of the geographic area. These parties include a shooter, a horn cutter and a 
carrier. Generally, the shooter is the most senior of them and receives the most 
pay, but there are counter-examples to this. There is a variety of backgrounds 
between rhinoceros poachers, but there are often ex-military and other spe-
cialist skill sets involved.20 Poaching is fairly difficult in places with less dense 
rhinoceros populations and made even more so by the presence of rangers. 
Rhinoceros can move up to 20 km per day and tracking them in savannah type 
terrain requires a seasoned tracker. Combined with search and destroy activity 
of rangers especially after the poachers have fired a shot, the poachers must 
have knowledge of the terrain, be well conditioned, be able to avoid rangers 
and aggressive animals present in protected areas.21
Elephant poachers function in a similar manner, but the conditions of ele-
phant poaching create a few specific requirements. The main difference between 
elephant poachers is that they can feature multiple shooters, from one to three, 
and have larger number of carriers, even up to 20. This is due to the fact that 
ivory has less value by kilogram and tusks are fairly heavy.22 Shooters can be 
highly professional and specialised, so much so that in Northern Tanzania only 
a few shooters have been identified doing almost all of the poaching, identifi-
able by their home crafted ammunition. Elephants are easier to track and find 
as they move in bigger herds. However, the biggest tusks are usually found on 
bull elephants who are solitary creatures and thus also need expert tracking.23
Elephants and rhinoceros live in protected areas, and in these protected areas 
rangers have the jurisdiction to enforce the law. While the legal details differ 
from country to country, the essential point to understand is that the animals 
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are already in an area that is monitored, has a security framework, has limited 
boundaries that need to be breached in order to poach and, while the animals 
are confined to areas, they are not static. The setting is very much like a coun-
ter-insurgency. There is a protected area with a protected community against 
which a group of specialised military-like units act– the only real difference 
between poaching and insurgency is the motivation of the poachers vs. insur-
gents. Indeed, in some regions such as Garamba National Park in the northern 
DRC, and even in much more peaceful Gabon, the poachers are insurgents. In 
the former case, these are either local DRC rebels, militias from South Sudan or 
Sudan, and even elements of the Lord’s Resistance Army.24 In Mwagne National 
Park in Gabon, for instance, the increasingly large armed groups are factions 
coming out of neighbouring Republic of Congo, and in Gabon’s Minkébé, it is 
from Cameroon, perhaps with parties backed by that country’s government.25
Comparing the Supply Side
It is worth comparing poaching to other major illicit trades to see how, on the 
supply-side, they are fundamentally different: approaches taken from coun-
ter-narcotics or counter-arms-smuggling and applied to poaching are unlikely 
to work as they share little in common. A clear view of the nature of the ‘prod-
uct’ in poaching – the animal – and its location (now principally in the hands 
of authorities) underline the different approach required to stop the trade at 
the demand end.
The main three illicit goods associated with organised crime internationally 
are narcotics cultivation, the organ trade and illegal arms trade. These three are 
each different from the other and are quite well researched. On the surface, they 
have distinct features that are comparable to the specifics of poaching. Narcotics 
cultivation is location specific and heavily dependent on the area, as the main 
commercial narcotics associated with organised crime can only be grown in 
specific climates without the use of greenhouses (leaving aside marijuana, now 
increasingly legal in many jurisdictions). Narcotics also share a similar demand 
structure to rhinoceros’ horn and ivory. They are mainly used for recreational 
purposes, unlike illegal arms and organs. Organ trafficking does not share the 
location specificity of poaching and narcotics, but like poaching, it involves the 
use of highly skilled professionals and considerably small trafficked items. Arms 
trafficking has a similar profile to poaching in terms of security. When produced, 
arms are usually legal, but they are diversified from this legal status by different 
means. In a sense, this compares quite well to rhinoceros and elephant, who by 
themselves are not illegal, but the product extracted from them is – and this 
extraction can only be done by breaching security measures.
The main cultivated narcotics associated with organised crime are coca, 
opium and cannabis. Two of them, opium and coca, are heavily restricted geo-
graphically and also by climate. Cannabis, in smaller scale but yet large enough, 
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can be grown everywhere in the world and thus makes for a poor comparison 
to poaching. The legalisation or decriminalisation of marijuana or its derivatives 
in many countries around the world, in part because of its legitimate medicinal 
uses and changing societal views on its use, further cause us to exclude it from 
comparison here.
Coca is cultivated almost exclusively in a relatively small area in South 
America: Peru, Bolivia and Columbia are the only nations where significant 
amounts are grown. The fight against coca cultivation shares some similarities 
to the rhinoceros’ problem, specifically that it is actually legal to grow coca in 
Bolivia (The Guardian, 24 April 2015). This is an interesting contrast to the legal 
hunting issue that the rhinoceros wars face. Supply-side strategies and tactics 
against coca cultivation include mass crop eradication and processing facility 
seizures and destruction. Mass eradication is very ineffective, and while tar-
geting of processing facilities has shown a bit more promise, the whole supply 
side combat has been extremely costly. According to a 1994 RAND study an 800 
million US dollar injection into supply side strategies netted a mere 1% loss in 
the end product – approximately three times more expensive than targeting 
domestic markets or the trafficking system.26
Opium shares a similar story. In Afghanistan and Myanmar, where the bulk of 
the world’s opium is produced, authorities have also had very little success with 
large-scale eradications, or with voluntary crop replacement. These strategies 
have also created a mass of social problems, especially in Afghanistan where the 
local population is very poor and unable to cope through forced eradication and 
loss of crops.27 Some success has been drawn from targeting production facilities 
that process the poppies. These facilities use large amounts of chemicals for the 
production and this has been used as a targeting tool. Alas, for rhinoceros horn 
nothing like this exists.
Thus, the campaigns against illegal narcotics make for a difficult comparison. 
There are very few lessons that are directly transferable to counter-poaching. 
The main problem is that the supply encompasses wide areas in terms of area 
for cultivation, and for processing crude structures are used that can be set up 
everywhere. In terms of geographic spread, production processes and the scale 
and bulk of resulting product movement, there are few similarities which would 
commend borrowing tactics from counter-narcotics to counter-poaching.
Organ trafficking seeks its victims among the extremely poor mainly from the 
global south. The term organ trafficking is a misnomer, as most illegal transplan-
tations happen in a location where the unwilling donor and/or the receiver have 
travelled to or have been trafficked to. The Hollywood and tabloid purported 
myth of forcibly removing organs in a back alley and taking them to another 
country is quite far from the truth, because the ischaemic times for organs are 
fairly short. The extracted organs need to find their receiver in as short a time as 
a couple of hours. Some organ trafficking cases are thus also human trafficking 
cases.28
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These networks share a similarity with rhino poaching, as they necessar-
ily feature a highly skilled specialist who does the procedure. Targeting these 
professionals is often problematic, as there are often cases where they might 
not even know they are doing a crime. Forged documents and tricked patients 
are more than often used in organ trafficking cases.29 This makes targeting the 
networks and the professionals problematic – unlike a rhino poacher who is 
very identifiable when they enter a national park.
On the supply side, organ trafficking networks can start nearly anywhere 
and seeking donor-victims and setting up the network can be done by nearly 
anyone without any specialist skills. The victims are also not in a short supply, 
although willing victims might be. There is no set area where the networks can 
function and it demands quite a lot of effort to pinpoint these people, even 
though they usually function in a semi-public role to lure in possible victims. The 
tactics used against these networks are usually slow operations making use of 
various intelligence methods and more akin to classical police work. These net-
works are very rarely disturbed and the efforts are usually targeted against the 
professionals who do the actual procedure or the recipient patients travelling 
for the unethical procedure.30 Interestingly, the crime is also ‘stateless’, in that 
there is no international legal code which controls or forbids the movement of 
organs internationally.31
Organ trafficking and rhinoceros poaching, however, share an interesting 
similarity. They both make use of highly skilled professionals, whose identifi-
cation and removal will usually destroy the network. The tactical solution to 
identifying, locating and capturing these professionals is vastly different though.
Illegal arms trade is a diverse field of organised crime. The supply comes 
from arms that are diverted from civilian or national stockpiles and a single 
case can range from a squadron of attack helicopters to a simple, single, 9 mm 
parabellum cartridge. These stockpiles are in a constant flow, are often easily 
tracked by serial number and so the whole chain from the manufacturers to the 
users is vulnerable to attack.
There are a few main methods of diverting weapons and ammunition from 
their stockpiles. Looting, theft and corruption are the most common, but legal 
purchase and then diverting to an illegal use has also been witnessed in large 
scale. The supply side strategies include three different categories: physical 
security, accounting and monitoring. Physical security includes fences, cam-
eras, armed guards, locks and deployed security forces. Accounting involves 
stockpile management through stock records, what has been issued and what 
has been expended. Monitoring includes measures through which firearms and 
ammunition can be tracked to specific lots or manufacturers, and reports and 
auditing of existing stockpiles.32
Interestingly, tactics from these three groups have all been used in coun-
ter-poaching. Especially monitoring methods, such as rhinoceros horn colouring 
or poisoning have been ineffective. Accounting has been poor in many countries 
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and at least in Zimbabwe has raised awareness to how bad the situation with 
black rhinoceros truly is. Physical security is of course being utilised all over 
Africa and at first glance seems to be quite well applicable – perimeter control 
through fences, restricting access and patrolling the area all seem like good 
features.33 And in fact they are, except there are a few very important key differ-
ences. Rhinoceros move around vast distances and most, if not all, of the parks 
with rhinoceros can control access only in a limited way, due to tourism, long 
borders and a lack of funding for physical security.
Fighting poaching requires a very different mind-set from organised crime in 
the supply side. In a poaching situation, an armed assailant enters a protected 
area. There is little to counter this in practical law enforcement methodology 
against organised crime. As was pointed out above, the problem here is that 
these other forms of illegal trafficking have been viewed as analogous to poach-
ing, and with the comparison the policing tactics and international policies used 
in those other situations have crept into counter-poaching. For example, the 
counter-narcotic mind-set where the product itself is ‘attacked’ has been utilised 
in many parts of Africa – these are the so-called animal-centric methods, horn 
removal and horn poisoning of rhinoceros. These methods have not been shown 
to deter poaching significantly, and at the same time they are very expensive.34 
It has ‘no effect on poaching rates because poachers ignore, or are not aware 
of, the difference between treated and untreated rhino horn, and additionally 
because poachers are not the end-users’.35
Thus, discussing counter-poaching tactics at a broader scale, there are some 
aspects of organised crime law enforcement that can be utilised. However, this 
utilisation needs a very thorough understanding of the poaching event and 
the surrounding conditions. Making a direct comparison between organised 
international crime and poaching and, what is more, treating poaching as 
organised crime, will not develop this understanding because it disregards 
all the factual data. First, because there is no evidence that poaching syndi-
cates function like organised criminal networks, and second, because the act 
of poaching is not meaningfully comparable to the supply side of organised 
illicit trade of goods.
We can see how attempts to map understanding of global smuggling of con-
traband has inaccurately coloured the understanding we have of the poaching 
problem by looking at one key diagram that is frequently used by counter-poach-
ing organisations: the ‘poaching pyramid’, the version provided here36 used by 
the UN CITES group, but also used by Interpol and other organisations (Figure 1).
This diagram might perhaps work if representing production of coca or heroin, 
but it does not look like rhino poaching. In the first instance, we can note that 
the top of the ‘chain’ (level 5) of international poaching is not a small number of 
consumers but actually quite a large number.37 But that matter is not what particu-
larly concerns this piece. Rather, we can point to two chokepoints: at level 1 (the 
poacher) and at level 4 (the international trafficker). It is indeed the case that there 
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is no lack of those willing to take part in the poaching endeavour – poverty and 
hunger will always trump abstract ideas like environmental integrity if you are an 
African villager – but the act of poaching cannot happen with porters alone. The 
act of stalking and shooting a rhino, as mentioned above, requires a narrow skill set, 
for if a poacher wishes to shoot a rare and elusive rhino he must find it. Therefore, 
the poacher must track the rhino, making him vulnerable to counter-poachers. The 
skill to track rhino for poaching is not widely available. Contrary to commonly held 
beliefs, there are a finite number of people who have the right personal charac-
teristics and skills necessary to hunt rhinoceros and to a lesser extent elephant.38 
If these people are disrupted they are not easily replaced and the skills not passed 
on.39 At Ngorongoro Crater, in northern Tanzania, poachers are known as ‘fundi’ 
meaning ‘specialist’ in Swahili, so rare have their skills become.40
At level 2 and 3, there is no lack of people capable of trafficking within any 
given country in Africa, so these levels are correct.41 But another major choke-
point exists when moving across international borders: these smuggling routes 
are controlled by a limited number of established actors, who are generally 
product agnostic: they will smuggle any low-bulk/high value item they can 
profit from. As Peter Younger, director of Interpol’s wildlife crime division noted, 
‘once you have that [smuggling] pipeline open, then you can smuggle pretty 
much anything down it. So if you can’t source wildlife today, and somebody says 
‘Listen, I’ve got a shipment of heroin, or I’ve got some illegal immigrants, or I’ve 
got some prostitutes that I want to get to somewhere’, you have a ready-made 
pipeline.42 Ivory is slightly different than rhino horn: the poaching is easier, the 
Figure 1. The cITeS ‘Poaching Pyramid’.
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trafficking is harder and requires specific infrastructure and to store and transfer 
the larger bulk. Still, however, the structure from supply-end to demand-end 
would in no way look like a pyramid. What we have instead is not a regular 
shape, but one of several choke points, looking perhaps like a spinning top as 
at Figure 2.
Using this diagram as our conceptual starting point, we can see that there 
are two chokepoints that we might best choose to attack: the poacher himself 
and the international trafficker. Since efforts at stopping international smug-
gling of anything has rarely proved effective due to the innate resilience of 
smuggling networks.43 We might therefore turn our attention to the poacher 
and the poaching party.
A better way to conceive of the poaching party is to drop any reference 
to international illicit trades and look to a harder-edged example: insurgency. 
Insurgency is a heavily studied phenomenon, and here we look more at its 
tactical aspects than its political ones.44 We can identify clearly that large-scale 
poaching networks do exploit the political weakness of many African states to 
better profit from the crime, but the ambitions of the poacher are not in the first 
instance political. Rather, we refer to the way that poachers operate within and 
through communities, and the way that they employ violence. The poacher is 
by legal definition illegitimate, and operates to avoid a response from the legit-
imate authorities. Equipped with ample cash, poaching syndicates are able to 
hire porters and buy supplies from local communities – an incentive that works 
against the authorities and undermines conservation efforts by denying those 
protecting the animals any local knowledge about the presence of poachers. But 
Figure 2. alternative poaching model.
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the act of poaching must extend beyond informal networks of local assistants, 
as the act in the end cannot happen without armed men finding and killing a 
moving target, the animal.
The poaching party thus resembles any of the insurgent groups operating in 
the Southern African ‘bush wars’ of the 1960s-1980s: armed groups in section 
to platoon size (that is, from 5 or 6 up to 30 or 40), moving quietly to find their 
target, kill it and remove themselves to safety. Armed well but without support 
weapons (anything more cannot be carried by a man moving quickly), they do 
not seek out confrontation with stronger government forces except when luck 
or timing presents them with local superiority of force. They do not seek to 
hold ground, but to exploit the inability of the governing authority to protect 
its terrain and key assets from the insurgent – a small group operating quietly 
over a very large terrain. But speaking tactically, the governments of South 
Africa and Rhodesia were, in their bush wars, able to neutralise the insurgents 
effectively.45 While their defeat politically was just and inevitable, operationally 
both governments developed tactics capable of blunting and even defeating 
the operational forces of the insurgents sent against them.
We may add, of course, that in parks such as Garamba in the DRC, the poacher 
does not just resemble an insurgent: this is in fact his role. Poaching is a business 
or logistic solution to their tactical or operational problems.46 The LRA may be 
generating a significant portion of their operational budget from poaching, as 
may some militias in South Sudan (The Telegraph, 12 Jan 2016). They are armed 
and equipped for ‘low intensity’ warfare.
Operations against the demand side of poaching are not likely to pay off in 
the time needed to preserve the rhino and elephant in the wild. Supply side 
enforcement approaches based on misunderstanding of the phenomenon are 
not currently working. Thus, it is to a ‘bush war’ approach we can look to find 
a meaningful, timely response to the devastating poaching plague currently 
sweeping through sub-Saharan Africa.
Poaching as a Tactical Problem
The main skill involved in stopping poachers – that is, the sine quo non shooter 
on the supply-side rather than the onwards smugglers – is combat tracking. This 
term likely arises from the same skill used by South African and Rhodesian forces 
in the Bush Wars, brought into use in conservation by veterans of those wars now 
protecting animals.47 Start with the idea of poaching as a tactical problem, with 
tactics being ‘the art of disposing forces, deploying them for combat to achieve 
a decision which furthers the operational aim with the maximum economy of 
effort’.48 More plainly, it is a problem involving the disposition and use of people 
and weapons in an engagement, in order to achieve an effect as efficiently as 
possible. The poacher must find his prey, approach it without disturbing it or 
being disturbed, kill the animal, remove its tusks or horns and then extract his 
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team and its booty to a safe place. The single point of failure for the poacher is 
then the animal: if they can be prevented from tracking and shooting the animal 
in the first place, there is no onwards criminal trafficking chain. So, if the parks 
wish to protect the rhino, elephant (amongst other HVS like big cats) from the 
poacher with the maximum economy of effort, they must also track the animal, 
where they are likely to encounter anyone else – the poacher/tracker – wishing 
to find the animal. Combat tracking has so far had the most significant effect in 
stopping the loss of animals because it attacks the most vulnerable chokepoint 
in the rhino poaching chain.
The variety of origin and distances travelled by poachers to their chosen 
hunting grounds highlights the rarity of their skill.49 Because the situation has 
gotten out of hand there, many more local people are learning the skills required 
by joining a poaching party that contains an experienced tracker, learning from 
them and then after a period of successful poaching, starting their own poach-
ing group. Due to the lack of success so far in intercepting poachers in Kruger, 
there is very little deterrent to a potential poacher, it being estimated that there 
are up to 12 poaching parties in Kruger at any one time.50
Elsewhere however poachers are found to cross borders and travel some 
distance in order to ply their trade. Zambians are used by poaching syndicates in 
Zimbabwe, and Zimbabweans poach in South Africa.51 In Gabon parks along the 
coasts (Akanda, Loango, Mayumba, Pongara and also Wonga Wongué), poachers 
come from China, Congo and Cameron, often from the sea, in the form of groups 
who conduct illegal fishing and night-time hunting.52 Even in Kruger with its 
mass of local poaching groups, Zimbabweans have been caught. Poachers travel 
to where they perceive there is a soft target and avoid what are considered 
hardened targets much closer to home. As the protected area became more 
proficient at protecting themselves, so too the poacher is forced to become 
more of a specialist. Weapons and ammunition have to be modified to lessen 
sound and increase penetration power and only after careful coordination and 
planning can the fundi poach a specifically targeted, lone elephant.53 Taken 
together, this has meant that the poachers are easier to identify because of the 
signature way they prepare their ammunition, there are less of them capable of 
the complexity required and less animals are poached in total, because of fear 
of interception by rangers the longer the poacher takes.
Aside from the difficulties in acquiring the skill to track animals in the bush 
in the first place, a poacher must also overcome a number of other barriers the 
poacher will also have to accept that he is being hunted by armed rangers as 
well as the other threats posed by the African bush. A poacher is motivated by 
monetary gain, not by ideological or political reasons. This makes them a lot 
more risk averse than a terrorist or insurgent and it is counter to their motivation 
to die in the process of acquiring wealth. Tracking is also a mentally draining, 
physically demanding and in the heat of the day, arduous task, involving walking 
for up to twelve or fourteen hours a day and constant observation and thought. 
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An incursion into a protected area may involve three or four days of constant 
tracking. Many poachers are found to be carrying high-strength painkillers 
to overcome the discomfort this effort causes their bodies.54 So a successful 
poacher needs to be well motivated. For all these reasons, the ability to track 
rhino effectively is not widely available.
Poachers are not hardened criminals and can be countered if funding and 
expertise are available. Poachers in many places have not been effectively chal-
lenged or disrupted by law enforcement. As a result habits common to criminals 
and insurgents, such as good information security, are often non-existent. Social 
media is used to brag about when poaching is going to take place and when it 
has been successful.55 Phone numbers and SIM cards are sometimes kept for a 
period of years without change.56 Even movements and habits are not varied as 
there is a feeling that there is no threat. Poachers have even been interviewed 
by newspapers in their own homes, without fear of consequence. Most of the 
criminals who make up the poaching networks are known to those conducting 
intelligence at the park level. The disruption of key personalities in these net-
works would grant significant periods of reduced poacher activity.
Poachers, where they have been countered effectively in the past, are often 
very averse to trying again in the same place for extended periods. After a series 
of poacher detentions at Stanley and Livingston private game reserve a period 
of three years without a poaching event was enjoyed.57 After combat tracking 
was introduced to Savé Valley and a series of contacts ensued, a twelve-month 
period free of poachers was enjoyed, where previously two poaching events a 
week were occurring. Similar results to these are demonstrated in many other 
locations, such as Ngorongoro Crater, Lower Zambezi National Park and the 
Selous Game Reserve (though the decline in poaching was shorter lived here).58 
Kruger seems to have suffered from the dual appeal of being ineffective at 
countering poaching (although this is changing) and having a massive rhino 
population, making the risk worthwhile to the poacher given the greater chance 
of reward.59
Resource levels to protect the animal matter, but not as much as mind-set and 
counter-poaching expertise. Many of those entrusted with countering poaching 
within a given protected area are conservationists or ecologists – not people 
of law enforcement or security background – who have held their positions as 
managers for decades. Their primary tasks as they see them are the manage-
ment of the environment in their care and the handling of problem animals 
and associated management or husbandry tasks.60 Tactical counter-poaching is 
something they do in addition, outside of their education and training. During 
normal times this was totally appropriate. However, with the unprecedented 
pressures of the last four years the situation has changed and the mind-set of 
those in these positions has struggled to change with it. Tactical solutions either 
hold little interest for the manager in this position or are simply met with a lack 
of comprehension or ability to apply.
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There is a focus on expensive animal-centric solutions like de-horning 
and horn poisoning and untried or ‘nice to have’ technological solutions, like 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).61 These tie up large amounts of funds which 
could be better directed at proven, practical approaches, such as combat track-
ing and human intelligence-based solutions. To provide some context, each 
de-horning costs approximately US$1,000, which represents four months’ wages 
for a qualified elite tracker. To operate an effective drone programme in one 
small park in Kwa-Zulu Natal Province costs $500,000 a year.62 The province has 
23 other parks and reserves. That scales up to $12 million for the province. Even 
if this was implemented, when a drone does find a poacher (which the drone 
does not do itself: each drone requires pilots as well as trained image analysts 
beyond the immense logistical and maintenance requirement), it still requires 
a highly trained and well-led ranger on the ground to make the interception. 
Applying counter-poaching measures and paramilitary solutions is less clinical 
sounding than using UAVs, and is often reacted to with suspicion or a lack of 
comprehension, though it represents a more sustainable and effective solution. 
Real gains, for relatively small amounts can be enjoyed by the counter-poach-
ing approach. Savé Valley Conservancy in Zimbabwe with the addition of just 
seven elite combat trackers delivered a massive poaching reduction in 2013.63 
Tracking as a counter-poaching method is poorly understood in many parts of 
Africa. There is a tendency to assume that it is reactive and that a tracker can 
never hope to catch up to a poacher by tracking, as the tracker is slowed by the 
process. This represents a lack of understanding of how to use the intelligence 
gained by the tracker.
Combat Tracking is an intelligence collection and prediction method, not 
just the following of footprints. Animals who are under greater threat are fol-
lowed some hours behind, or areas are patrolled where previous poaching has 
occurred. When a poacher’s tracks are identified the tracker does not attempt 
to catch up, but radios up the location, age and the direction of travel of these 
tracks.64 The head ranger then consults a map and makes an assessment of where 
the poacher is likely to be at present and where he will be in the near future 
(assisted by earlier, professional ‘Intelligence Preparation of the Environment’ – a 
systematic plotting of the opponents’ tactics against the ground they are on).65 
This is often made easier by the rhino themselves who are creatures of habit, 
with rangers often having a good idea of where the rhino is. The head ranger 
then sends out cut off groups to get between the poacher and the rhino, either 
with aircraft if available, or by vehicle, to cover the distance quickly. These cut-
off groups then dismount and move in at different points along the poachers 
predicted path searching for the poachers’ tracks.66 If the ranger finds he is ahead 
of the poacher, an ambush is set and an interdiction made.
This process is inexpensive and requires only one member per patrol to 
be combat tracker trained, the rest of the patrol being for numerical advan-
tage. This goes some way to explaining why some large protected areas with 
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comparatively small budgets are having more success than areas with much 
larger budgets and resources. One can see also how this is more than reactive 
anti-poaching, more than reciprocal action in response to a poaching event. It 
is counter-poaching, attempting to prevent the poaching event by targeting 
the poacher.
Conservation organisations such as African Parks have made strides in coun-
ter-poaching in part because of their focus on intelligence sharing between 
parks. Poaching is of course a dynamic business: it changes its profile depending 
on demand and adopts new techniques to counter established defences. But if 
parks share information they can help offset the poachers’ dynamic advantage. 
Should one park notice a new poaching technique – say, use of poisoned water-
melons to kill elephant – other parks can begin to identify individuals who have 
bought large quantities of watermelon from local markets. Should the size of 
poaching parties or their composition change in one region or park, rangers in 
other parks can adapt pre-emptively, changing their patrolling profile to look 
for the new technique.
Fusion of the intelligence between protected areas, not governments, is key. 
Trying to fix the poaching problem from the national level down is difficult. Most 
protected areas operate as states within states or ‘mini-states’.67 This makes them 
independent, but isolated. They cannot report to or request information from 
state agencies that would traditionally be turned to, because of high levels of 
corruption. Further, these protected areas within a given country rarely com-
municate with each other as they are often competing for the same resources. 
Massive amounts of data including names, phone numbers and routines of key 
individuals are trapped at the park level, because parks do not trust government 
agencies, often with good reason. Those that are too effective will affect the 
revenue flow, or even uncover evidence implicating, corrupt individuals within 
government. If this is being reported through official channels, those being 
a nuisance to poaching will be removed from their positions. However, there 
are human intelligence networks focused against poaching that stretch from 
South Africa to the Congo, and these could be co-ordinated. Under the right 
circumstances, Parks are willing to share information. Game Reserves United 
(GRU) existed purely as an intelligence and security organisation funded by its 
members for the protection of their reserves. These reserves shared informa-
tion internally and did their best to disrupt poachers, before they ever got to 
the reserve. This resulted in a 50% reduction two years in a row within those 
areas that were protected by GRU.68 This was even more exceptional, given their 
location on the western boundary of Kruger.
The parks that have the best counter-poaching intelligence are those that 
have established local information networks in the communities in and sur-
rounding the parks. This is a critical step for all parks across Africa who hope 
to preserve species of any type. This is not coercive intelligence gathering or 
corrosive informant networks: it is a matter of convincing the local populations 
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that it is in their interests to maintain the integrity of the park because doing so 
will make life better for them. ‘If a species pays, it stays’,69 as one analyst has said, 
speaking with a pure micro-economic outlook. Park-level intelligence against 
poaching (as in counter-insurgency) will work best when combined with com-
munity development and health-care, a general enfranchisement in the life of 
the park. When, as in Ngorongoro in Tanzania and in the Lewa and Borana con-
servancies in Kenya, the local population believe they will prosper more if the 
poachers are kept out, then it will be harder for poachers to operate: they will 
lack porters, local guides and will lose the intelligence war.70 So, conservation 
money needs to go to people as well as to animals.
Conclusions: An Aggressive Defence of the Animal
Halting the decline of the rhino at the hands of poachers has failed in part 
because of misconceptions on the nature of poaching networks. A clearer under-
standing of these networks which focuses on the keystone tracker/shooter is, 
on evidence to date, a more viable approach. While efforts to halt international 
trafficking, and to reduce demand should and must continue, the only way to 
save the rhino is to physically defend them in the limited time we have at current 
poaching rates. This requires intelligence, intelligence sharing and well-trained 
rangers adopting an aggressive counter-poacher approach based on combat 
tracking. Counter-poaching must take a tactical approach – to treat poaching 
as a tactical event in a larger bush-war – if it hopes to ever effectively protect 
the high-value species. This does not mean law-enforcement is set aside, but 
rather that it depends first on successful tactical behaviours. Law enforcement 
and conservation on their own will not save the rhino.
The counter-poaching approach encapsulated in Combat Tracking works 
because it targets the single point at which the poacher must approach the HVS, 
and is not sensitive to the price of ivory/horn, the involvement of sophisticated 
international syndicates and most other exogenous characteristics of CITES-
listed trade. It does depend on several other factors which further commend the 
approach: We can note that it is not subject to the vagaries of law enforcement 
efforts across multiple jurisdictions, as it takes place entirely within the protected 
area or park, which in most of Africa permits the application of deadly force 
against armed incursion. Critically, it is dependent on good intelligence amongst 
the residents of the park and its environs. Park managers thus have a critical 
incentive to involve local populations in the protection of their park ecosystems 
to gain information. It is those parks who manage an integrated law-enforce-
ment/community engagement approach who have had the best results (Majete 
National Park in Malawi being an excellent example) in pre-empting poaching 
and dissuading and arresting, rather than shooting, key poachers and trackers.71
There is an argument in the literature which criticises the securitised “coun-
ter-poaching” approach, which this paper may be seen to advocate.72 Some of 
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these criticisms are valid in that they are aimed at counter-poaching techniques 
which have been misconceived, based as they are on an incorrect understanding 
of the structure of poaching networks. This paper has hopefully moved beyond 
these critiques by a better conception of the problem. It is imperative that the 
parks themselves play a role in halting the poaching war they are currently 
losing: the sole node they can affect is the skilled poacher, so they must, while 
other agencies continue their work (perhaps less successfully) at other levels 
of the poaching chain.
Throughout this paper, the authors have been conscious of a deep ethical 
question which we cannot, within the confines of our research or expertise, fully 
discuss, and that is the correctness of applying deadly force against people to 
protect animals. Across Africa laws have already been enacted by the various 
sovereignties allowing this expressly – the logic perhaps being that the greater 
good and welfare of any nation’s citizens is increased not only by biodiversity, 
but also by the revenues generated by legitimate eco-tourism. We can also 
note, however, that those engaged in poaching in Africa today are substan-
tially outlaws already, being engaged in or strongly linked to insurgency and 
rebellion. We may wish for a world where park rangers can deal principally with 
husbandry and conservation, but that is not the world that militarised poachers 
have allowed us to keep.
This article has focused strongly on rhino poaching, as this is the most crit-
ically endangered and most heavily poached HVS in sub-Saharan Africa. But 
the counter-poaching approach with its emphasis on intelligence as well as 
community engagement, can also help reduce other key threats to the viability 
of African parks, their environmental integrity and their species. There are other 
types of serious threat to the integrity of Africa’s parks, and the solution offered 
here will not fit all of them. However, it can be said that a clearer analysis of the 
drivers of, for example, illegal charcoal production, exotic species capture and 
trafficking and bush-meat hunting/poaching, may find the approach detailed 
here may help also in reducing these destructive practices. Certainly, an intel-
ligence & analysis-driven approach to conservation can only help to increase 
our understanding of the phenomena.
It is a sad reality now that Africa’s once abundant biodiversity is restricted in 
many aspects only to protected areas. Whereas even a few decades ago the con-
cepts described here could not have worked due to the huge range of space over 
which HVSs like rhino and elephant roamed, they are now restricted to relative 
pinpoints which can, and must, be defended. Africa’s parks must now actively 
defend the species and spaces that foreign demand has driven to the brink.
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